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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
AMENDMENT TO CRIMINAL PLEADINGS
The defendant was charged with unlawfully engaging in a game of
chance for money, in violation of a municipal ordinance, "at 112
Superior street . . ." At the conclusion of the evidence for the city, the
trial court permitted the prosecutor to amend the affidavit whereby the
charge was preferred to include therein the words "also I I4-I 6- 1i8-
120 Superior St." To this the defendant objected. The affidavit was
not reverified, nor was defendant arraigned upon it, nor did he plead
to it, as amended. Without offering any evidence, the defendant rested
and moved for a directed verdict, which motion was overruled, and the
court, (trial by jury having been waived), found the defendant guilty
and imposed sentence. Defendant appealed and the judgment was
affirmed, the Court of Appeals holding that, although a court is power-
less to amend an affidavit charging a crime in a pending criminal pro-
ceeding, the amendment attempted was not prejudicial to the defendant,
and therefore, under the provisions of Ohio Gen. Code 13449-5, it
did not constitute reversible error. City of Toledo v. Harris, 56 Ohio
App. 251, 1o N.E. (2d) 454, 9 Ohio Op. 356 (x937).
The court was confronted with two statutory enactments providing
for amendment of indictment and information in certain instances1 but
disposed of these obstacles by invocation of the "expressio unius" doctrine,
saying that the express stipulations with regard to indictment and infor-
mation indicated a purpose not to extend such power as to affidavits.
The theory of the court in denying the right to amend was expressed in
1 Ohio Gen. Code 13433-z: "Upon examination of the charge, the court or magistrate
shall have the power to amend the warrant or information to conform to the facts and
the evidence, provided the amendment shall not change the nature of the crime."
Ohio Gen. Code 13437-29: "The court may at any time before, during or after the
trial amend the indictment, information or bill of particulars, in respect to any defect,
imperfection or omission in form or substance, or of any variance with the evidence, pro-
vided no change is made in the name or identity of the crime charged. If any amendment
be made to the substance of the indictment or information or to cure a variance between
the indictment or information, and the proof, the accused shall on his motion be entitled
to a discharge of the jury, if a jury has been impaneled, and to a reasonable continuance
of the cause, unless it shall clearly appear from the whole proceedings that he has not been
misled or prejudiced by the defect or variance in respect to which the amendment is made,
or that his rights will be fully protected by proceeding with the trial, or by a postponement
thereof to a later day with the same or another jury. In case a jury shall be discharged
from further consideration of a case under this section, the accused shall not be deemed to
have been in jeopardy. No action of the court in refusing a continuance or postponement
under this section shall be reviewable except after motion to and refusal by the trial court
to grant a new trial therefor, and no writ of error or other appeal based on such action
of the court shall be sustained, nor reversal had, unless from consideration of the whole
proceedings, the reviewing court shall find that the accused was prejudiced in his defense
or that a failure of justice resulted."
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the following: "An affidavit is sponsored by an individual. It must be
sworn to by him. To change his sworn statement and make him say
under oath something he has not said, and might be unwilling to say,
would indeed be a dangerous procedure."
The question of amendment of criminal pleadings is steeped in an
historical background as old as Anglo-American freedom, and to fully
understand the perplexities confronting the courts today, it is necessary
to look to the origins of the grand jury system and the fundamental con-
cepts underlying its inception. The grand jury arose primarily as a bul-
wark against aggression by the King and to the present day has retained
a character essentially defensive. The crown has always enjoyed the
right of instituting criminal prosecutions, and the abuse of this prerogative
by the Stuart kings was one of the principal reasons for the jealous
exercise by the king's subjects of their rights based on the principle stated
in the Magna Carta, (1215), that a freeman cannot be deprived of life,
liberty, or property except by the "lawful judgment of his peers."
Herein was elucidated the basic thought upon which our theories regard-
ing the necessity of a formal accusation as essential to a trial for crime
were evolved. At common law the requirement was met by evolution
of the indictment and the information, the former then lying for all
treasons, felonies, or misdemeanors, for statutory as well as common
law crimes, (Clarke, Crim. Proc. 2d ed. 124), the latter only for mis-
demeanors. Moreover, an indictment was necessary for the prosecution
of any crime above a misdemeanor, "for it is the policy of the common
law that no man shall be put upon his trial for felony until the necessity
therefor has been determined by a grand jury on oath." (Clark, Crim.
Proc. 2d ed. 125; I Chitty Cr.L. 844; 2 Hale P.C. 151; 4 Bl. Comm.
310; 2 Hawk. P.C. c. 26, sec. 3; Com. v. Barrett, 9 Leigh (Va.)
665 (1839). Conversely, no felony could be prosecuted by informa-
tion. State v. Town of Dover, 9 N.H. 468 (1838).
Upon the withdrawal of the American colonies from the Empire,
many of these tenets were carefully preserved in our own jurisprudence.
The colony of Virginia steadfastly refused to ratify the Constitution until
it was assured that a Bill of Rights would be incorporated therein, and
thus we find that document reciting that "No person shall be held to
answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a present-
ment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war
or public danger; nor shall any person * * * be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." (U. S. Const., Am. Art. V.)
This provision does not, however, operate as a limitation upon, or restric-
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tion of the criminal procedure of the several states. Stockum v. State,
io6 Ohio St. 249, 139 N.E. 855 (1922), approving and following
Prescott v. State, i Ohio St. 184 (1869). Consequently, similar pro-
visions have been enacted into the constitutions of nearly all of the states.
Prior to the Constitution of 1851, Ohio required petit larceny and like
offenses to be prosecuted by indictment, Cole v. State, 29 Ohio St. 226
(1876), but, by the Constitution of 1851 the Legislature was author-
ized to dispense with indictment in "cases of petit larceny and other
inferior offenses," Cole v. State, supra, and presently the Ohio Consti-
tution (1851-1912) Art. I, sec. io, provides: "Except in cases of im-
peachment, cases arising in the army or navy, or in the militia when in
actual service in time or war or public danger, and cases involving
offenses for which the penalty provided is less than imprisonment in the
penitentiary, no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise
infamous, crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand
jury . ."' These constitutional stipulations vary from state to state as
to the degree of crime triable only on indictment. There seem to be
three prominent classifications, viz., (I) indictment required for a
"capital or otherwise infamous crime," as in Ohio; (2) indictment
necessary wherever indictment will lie; and (3) indictment necessary
only where the offense is punishable by death or life imprisonment.
(Clark, Crim. Proc. 2d ed. 126.) Other lesser degrees of variation
exist among the individual charters. (A.L.I., Code of Crim. Proc.,
Tent. Draft No. I, p. 324, et seq.) Thus, where the constitution of the
particular state does not require indictment, it is competent for the legis-
lature to provide for the prosecution of all offenses, even capital, by
information. Some states have so done, and in these jurisdictions it has
been held that the "due process" clause of the Constitution of the United
States, (Am. Art. V, and Am. Art. XIV), is not violated by the aboli-
tion of the grand jury system and indictment, "provided some other
formal and sufficient mode of accusation, as by information, is substi-
tuted." Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 58i, 20 Sup. Ct. 448, 44 L. Ed.
597 (I9OO); Hurtado v. California, 1io U. S. 516, 28 L. Ed. 232,
2 By Art. I, Sec. so, the framers of the Ohio Const. left proceedings as to lesser
offenses to the discretion of the Legislature. Dillingham v. State, 5 Ohio St. a8o, as Ohio
Jur. 683, sec. 9. In discharge of this autjhority Section 13437-34 of the Gen. Code was
enacted, providing that, "In prosecutions for misdemeanor in the court of common pleas,
indictment by the grand jury shall not be necessary, but such prosecution may be upon
information filed and verified by the prosecuting attorney of the county, or by affidavit when
such method is by statute especially provided.... "
In Ohio the information must be founded upon a warrant issued charging the person
informed against with the commission of the crime. Eichenlaub v. State, 36 Ohio St.
140 (x8o); Weisbrok v. State, 5o Ohio St. 19Z, 33 N.E. 603 (1893); Kabach v. State,
a O.C.C. (N.S.) 133, S O.C.D. 488 (1904); Oberer v. State, 8 O.C.C. (N.S.) 93, 8
O.C.D. 62o (1904).
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4 Sup. Ct. III, Dissent 292 (884). But, despite this, no state has,
as yet, abolished the grand jury.' Thus, presently, the necessity for a
formal accusation remains ingrained in our criminal law, and so strongly,
in fact, that the courts with unanimity hold that jurisdiction to proceed
with trial for crime cannot be acquired otherwise, no even by consent of
the accused.' Ex parte Bain, 121 U. S. I, 7 Sup. Ct. 781, 30 L. Ed.
849 (1887); People v. Campbell, 4 Parker Cr. R. (N. Y.) 386
(1859.)
The restriction against amendment of criminal pleadings seems to
have had its basis in humanitarian instinct. "A century and a half ago
considerably over a hundred offenses were punishable by death in Eng-
land, and a vigorous strictness in the framing of indictments arose in
that country, from the humane tendency of the judges to seize on any
flaw in the indictment when a life might thereby be saved." (7 A.L.R.
15 16). However, the fundamental distinction between indictments and
informations operated to cause the courts to distinguish between the
relative amendability of each. Thus, at common law, an indictment,
being dependent for its validity upon the finding of the grand jury on
oath, was not amendable, and this was so whether the offense charged
was a felony or a misdemeanor.5  Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burrows, 2527
(1770); People v. Campbell, supra; Ex parte Bain, supra. On the
other hand, at common law an information could be amended by the
prosecuting officer at any time by leave of court. State v. Weare, 38
N. H. 314 (1859); State v. White, 64 Vt. 372, 24 At. 250 (1892);
Rex v. Wilkes, supra. There seems to be no question at the present day
that this rule as to amendment of informations has not been rendered
more stringent, and that informations are more or less easily amendable
in all jurisdictions where they are used as a method of accusation.
People v. Henssler, 48 Mich. 49, IX N.W. 804 (1882); Attorney-
General v. Henderson, 3 Anstr. 714, Eng. Exch. (796). Amend-
'For discussion and summarization, see A.L.I., Code of Crim. Proc., Tent. Draft
No. 1, p. 57.
" "The charge as made, being a felony, the Constitution of this State requires the
presentment or indictment of a grand jury as a prerequisite to trial; and, if the pleading
they file with the court could be remodeled by stipulations between the counsel, the
defendant would not be tried upon the presentment of the grand jury, but rather upon the
consent of counsel. This court cannot acquire jurisdiction to try an offense by consent, nor
can its jurisdiction over an offense be changed by consent so as to embrace any other than
that presented by the grand jury, where the action of that body is requisite." People v.
Campbell, supra.
'The question of prior consent given by the grand jury to the court to amend the
indictment as to matters of form, although a related subject, is not discussed in this note
as not presenting the same questions, and not being of the same practical significance.
' "An officer of the crown has the right of framing them [informations] originally,
and may, with leave, amend, in like manner as any plaintiff may do. If the amendment
can give occasion to a new defense, the defendant has leave to change his plea." Lord
Mansfield, in Rex v. Wilkes, supra, at 2569.
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ment can be effected after trial has begun, State v. Stebbins, 29 Conn.
463, 79 Am. Dec. 223 (1861), and may include both matters of
form and matters of substance. State v. Barrell, 75 Vt. 202, 54 Atl.
183, 98 Am. St. Rep. 813 (1903). In this latter case it was held that
the amendment could be made by the prosecutor's successor in office,
which holding is entirely consistent with the established view that the
information is filed by the prosecutor in his official, rather than indi-
vidual, capacity. Rex v. Wilkes, supra.
The most troublesome problem re amendments is that involving
indictments. In ascertaining the present state of the law relative to
amendment of indictments it is necessary to make a primary distinction
between matters of form and those of substance. As a broad generality
it may be said that the former are 'amendable, and the latter are not.
(Clark, Crim. Proc. 2d ed. 365.) However, as is true of the majority
of sweeping statements, this assertion is not entirely accurate. In the
great majority of American jurisdictions and in England, statutes have
been enacted which, in varying degree, authorize the courts to amend
the pleadings of the prosecution,' and generally, in their absence, no
amendment is possible. However, it is almost universally recognized
that the caption may be amended, regardless of the statute. State v.
Moore, 1 Ind. 548 (1849), permitting insertion of "oath" where
omitted after "upon our ... ;" Hightower v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. Rep.
258, 165 S.W. 184 (1914), and State v. McCarty, 2 Pinney (Wis.)
513, 54 Am. Dec. 150 (1850), each permitting incorporation of the
term of court, as a matter of form, where omitted. That this was the
rule in Ohio prior to the enactment of any statute see State v. Smith,
Tappan (orig.) 261, (rep.) 229 (1818), wherein the court permitted
amendment of the date to conform with the facts, and Smith v. State,
4 Dec. Rep. 48, Clev. L. Rec. 62 (I855), holding that insertion of the
' See A.L.I. Code of Crim. Proc., Tent. Draft No. 1, p. 489 et seq., for discussion
and summarization of various statutory provisions.
Legislative enactment has provided Ohio with five statutory provisions authorizing
amendment of criminal pleadings of various types in different particulars. Section 53437-
29, the widest in scope of these sections, permits amendment as to either form or substance,
by the court, of indictment, information or bill of particulars, in respect to any defect,
imperfection or omission in form or substance, at any time before, during or after the
trial, but expressly prohibits amendment as to name or identity of the crime charged.
Section 13437-27 provides that "If the court be of the opinion that the third defect
[uncertainty] exists in the indictment or information, it may order that the indictment
or information be amended to cure such defect, provided, no change is to be made in the
name or identity of the crime charged." Section 13437-34 states that "The provisions of
law as to form and sufficiency, amendments, objections and exceptions to indictments * * *
shall apply to such informations." Section 13433-2 permits amendment by the court or
magistrate, of warrants or informations, "to conform to the facts and the evidence, pro-
vided the amendment shall not change the nature of the charge." Section 134.33-3 permits
a changing of the grade of the offense from misdemeanor to felony, or vice versa, by the
court or magistrate. Other corollary sections are 13437-7 and 13449-5.
term of court is an immaterial amendment and one not affecting the
validity of the indictment. Contra, Cruiser v. State, 18 N.J.L. 206
(i 84 1), in the absence of statute. However, the caption is not generally
considered a part of the indictment, so this does not impliedly authorize
further amendment. (Clark, Crim. Proc. 2d ed. 158). Other amend-
ments, as a rule, are dependent upon statute for their permissibility.
Although in Lasure v. State, 19 Ohio St. 43 (1869), a misnomer
of the accused was held amendable in the absence of statute, the general
view is that such amendment is not permissible save under an enabling
statute. People v. Carroll, 39 Cal. App. 654, iSo Pac. 49 (1919),
upholding an amendment striking out the name of a third person incor-
porated through typographical error into the indictment, and inserting
the name of the accused.' Thus, under statute authorizing amendment
as to matters of form, it has been held permissible to amend the name of
the victim, in an indictment for homicide, to conform with the facts.
Davis v. State, 150 Miss. 797, 117 So. i 16 (1928), permitting amend-
ment both as to Christian name and surname; State v. Champagne,
16o La. 47, io6 So. 670 (1925), with the proviso that the identity of
the victim could not be changed, identity being a matter of substance.
See also, Vilkinson v. State, 77 Miss. 705, 27 So. 639 (x9oo), wherein
amendment was permitted to indicate an infanticide, the particular code
provision permitting amendment to remedy variances in descriptions
and names of victims of the crime committed by the accused.' Similarly,
amendments correcting misnomers of the owners of property have been
upheld in numerous instances. .dbney v. State, 20 Ohio L. Abs. 296,
7 Ohio Op. 337 (935), holding that under statute,1" amendment of
indictment charging theft of an automobile by changing the statement
of ownership to include the equitable as well as the legal owner, is not
prejudicial error; People v. Richards, 44 Hun, 278, 5 N.Y. Crim.
Rep. 355 (1887), indictment for burglary; Collier v. State, 154 Miss.
446, 122 So. 538 (1929), and People v. Herman, 45 Hun, (N. Y.)
175 (1887), indictment for larceny; State v. Luce, 194 Iowa 13o6,
191 N.W. 64 (1922), indictment for breaking an entering to commit
larceny; Graves v. State, 148 Miss. 62, 114 So. 123 (1927). And,
misnomers of injured persons other than victims of homicide or owners
of property have been held properly amendable. People v. Castaldo,
146 App. Div. 767, 131 N.Y.S. 545 (1911), victim, in indictment for
felonious assault; State v. Haapanen, 129 Me. 28, 149 Atl. 389
By virtue of see. iooS, Deering Cal. Penal Code (931).
189z Miss. Code, sec. 1435.
, Ohio Gen. Code, 13437-z9, supra.
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(1930), purchaser inserted, in indictment for unlawful sale of intoxi-
cating liquors.
The date of the offense is generally regarded as a matter of f6rm,
and as such is amendable under statutory authorization. People v. Lewis,
132 App. Div. 256, II6 N.Y.S. 893 (1909); Washington v. State,
152 Miss. 154, 118 So. 719 (1928), indictment for possession of a
still. But, where time is of the essence of the crime, it is a matter of
substance, and not amendable. State v. Faulks, 97 N.J.L. 408, 117
Atl. 476 (1922).
Amendment of the description of the offense is more rigorously
restricted, but the majority view permits such procedure insofar'as the
defendant's defense on the merits is not prejudiced thereby. State v.
Foxton, 166 Iowa 181, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 919, 147 N.W. 347, Ann.
Cas. I913 E, 727 (1914), permitting such amendment, where the in-
dictment was for obtaining money under false pretenses, but stipulating
that the nature or degree of the crime cannot be changed; People v.
Bellamy, 79 Cal. App. 16o, 248 Pac. 1042 (1926), pointing out that
the amendment must be unquestionably as to form; State v. Riddle,
324 Mo. 96, 23 S.W. (2d) 179 (1929), permitting amendment to
incorporate in the indictment the necessary formal words of the statute;
State v. Foster, 56 Ohio App. 267, 1O N.E. (2d) 786, 23 Ohio L.
Abs. 278, 9 Ohio Op. 363 (1936), permitting amendment to insert
the word "motor" before "truck" where the charge was driving a motor
vehicle while intoxicated, in order to put the indictment in the words of
the statute. And an amendment of the description of property involved
is usually permitted as a matter of form. People v. Cockrill, 62 Cal.
App. 22, 216 Pac. 78 (1923), affirmed in 268 U.S. 258, 69 L. Ed.
944, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 490 (1925). So too, more clerical errors are
invariably held amendable. Dedge v. State, 28 Ga. App. 558, 112 S.E.
155 (1922); State v. Donato, io6 N.J.L. 397, 148 Ad. 776 (1930).
And, in Pierpont v. State, 49 Ohio App. 77, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 315, 2
Ohio Op. 240, 195 N.E. 264 (1934)
, 
the court held that, under Gen.
Code 13437-29 it was not prejudicial error to insert the words "true
bill" over the signature of the grand jury foreman, where they had
been omitted by inadvertence. But the defendant may not be surprised
by an amendment. People v. Scanlon, 132 App. Div. 528, 117 N.Y.S.
57 (1909)-
Although, as has been seen, amendment is customarily permitted as
to matters of form under numerous statutory provisions authorizing such
steps, this is not so where matters of substance are involved. Although
the statutes are plentiful permitting amendment as to formal matters,"
" See A.L.I., Code of Crim. Proc., Tent. Draft No. 1, P. 489 et see.
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only one, that enacted in Ohio, 2 expressly authorizes amendment of
matters of substance. However, at this point the crux of the problem
does not concern primarily the amendability of matters of substance, but
rather the distinction between matters of form and matters of substance.
In this regard one court has remarked that "A nice critic might insist
that form is substance in criminal pleading." U. S. v. Jackson, 2 Fed.
502, 504. But the courts do not so hold. Another court propounded
the following: "In general, I think it may be laid down that the state-
ment of every fact necessary to be proven to make the act complained
of a crime, is matter of substance in an indictment . . ." State v. 9ni-
don, 58 Vt. 524, 2 Ad. 154, 6 Am. Crim. Rep. 41 (1885). Clark
states that "No omission or misstatement which prevents the indictment
from showing on its face that an offense has been committed or from
showing what offense it intended to be charged, is mere matter of form.
It is matter of substance, and cannot be cured by amendment at the
trial." (Clark, Crim. Proc. 2d ed. 365.) From these definitions it is
manifest that miswriting, missspelling, false or improper English, and the
like, are not matters of substance. There are, however, certain matters
which are fairly consistently catalogued as substance and as such not
amendable. Prominent among these are those facts concerning the
identity of the injured person. "Amendment of indictment by substitut-
ing therein the name of another person as the one injured, when work-
ing a change of identity, is an amendment in substance which the courts
are not authorized to make." (68 A.L.R. 928, 936.) Thus, where it
appears that the name mistakenly alleged as the owner of property, in an
indictment for larceny, is in fact that of an existing person in the juris-
diction, no amendment will be permitted, as working a change in iden-
tity. Blumenberg v. State, 55 Miss. 528, 3 Am. Crim. Rep. 284
(878). A New Jersey court went so far as to remark that the allega-
tion of ownership is essential to an indictment for larceny, and that any
change of the allegation setting forth the name of the owner of the
property alleged to have been stolen would be an amendment in sub-
stance, and not permissible. State v. Cohen, 105 N.J.L. 529, 147 Atl.
325 (1929). And, in State v. Morgan, 35 La. Ann. 1139 (1883),
it was held, where the indictment was for rape, that it was error to
permit substitution of the name of the actual victim in the stead of the
name erroneously inserted, such interchange being highly prejudicial to
the defendant as effecting a change in identity.
Although time is ordinarily a matter of form, it can, in various in-
stances, be one of substance. As in State v. Faulks, supra, where the
12 Ohio Gen. Code 13437-29. See note supra.
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indictment for carnal abuse clearly showed the complainant to be over
sixteen years of age at the time of the offense. Amendment to place
the girl's age as less than sixteen was denied on the ground that it
would change the nature of the offense from fornification to carnal
abuse. Again, in State v. Sing Lee, 94 N.J.L. 266, iiO Ad. 113
(1920), an amendment seeking to insert as additional matter, other
dates than the date specified was denied on the ground that it would
multiply the offense, the indictment charging but one. But, in People
v. Glum, 213 Mich. 651, 182 N.W. 136, 15 A.L.R. 253, (1921), it
was held not error to permit the amendment, at the trial, of an indict-
ment charging the sale of stock without a license on a specified date so
as to charge that the sales were on the date specified and divers other
dates. So, in indictments for burglary it is customarily held that omission
of the allegation "in the night time" is fatal and irremediable by amend-
ment, Dickson v. State, 20 Fla. 800, 5 Am. Crim. Rep. 297 (1884),
although, as before seen, alteration as to day, month, or year, is com-
monly allowed, State v. Johnson, 35 La. Ann. 842 (1883), the
materiality of the former allegation being the distinguishing feature.
However, the date of commission of an offense may be a matter of
substance where such allegation is required by the statute defining the
crime; Kirkendall v. State, 78 Texas Cr. Rep. 168, 18o S.W. 676
(1915), wherein the defendant was charged with abandonment of his
wife, and the omitted allegation was held incurable by amendment. But
Texas is inclined to view time as a matter of substance regardless.
Kirkendall v. State, supra.
Clearly the nature of the offense is a matter of substance, and here
the courts are unanimous in refusing to countenance any alteration
which will effect a change in the nature of the crime charged, on the
basis of fact that such amendment would be extremely prejudicial to the
accused and an infringement upon his constitutional right to present-
ment or indictment by a grand jury. Thus, an indictment not legally
charging an offense cannot be amended. People v. Millsap, 85 Cal.
App. 732, 26o Pac. 378 (1927). Accord, Jannaci v. State, 44 Ohio
App. 228, 184 N.E. 843, 13 Ohio L. Abs. 541, 37 Ohio L.R. 469
(1933). Here the indictment was for rape and the court ruled that
it could not amend an indictment so as to change the identity of the
crime, saying that an amendment whereby the essentials of a crime are
supplied by insertion of the words "unlawful," and "forcibly and against
her will" which were lacking in the original indictment, is inadmissible
under Ohio Gen. Code 13437-29."3 Nor may the nature of the offense
be changed by amendment. Rex v. Voll, 48 Ont. L. Rep. 437, 57
D.L.R. 440 (1920); CoM. v. Snow, 269 Mass. 598, 169 N.E. 542
(1930); Kemp v. State, 121 Miss. 58o, 83 So. 744 (192o). Thus,
where the prosecutor attempted to strike out a clause to reduce the
crime charged from murder to manslaughter, the New York court
thwarted the effort, holding that, were the amendment permitted, the
indictment would no longer be that of a grand jury, and prosecution
thereon would violate the Fifth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution."4 People v. Ilotello, 157 App. Div. 510, 142 N.Y.S. 622
(1913). But see State v. Doucet, 177 La. 63, 147 So. 500 (I933),
permitting a charge of murder to be reduced to manslaughter, on motion
made in open court in the presence of the defendant, without formal
amendment. And, where the indictment charges too many crimes, it is
competent to strike out all but one where the accused is not thereby
prejudiced. State v. Clement, So N.J.L. 669, 77 At. io67 (1910);
State v. Lamb, Si N.J.L. 234, So At. III (1911); Com. v. Smith,
24 Pa. Dist. Rep. 936 (1914). But an indictment may not be amended
to permit a trial upon a crime not charged by the grand jury, albeit a
crime is charged in the indictment. People v. Bogdanoff, 254 N. Y.
16, 171 N.E. 590 (1930). The courts are in accord that an essential
allegation omitted cannot be supplied by amendment. Iannaci v. State,
supra; Com. v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 378, 162 N.E. 733 (1928),
wherein the requisite averment, "wilfully and maliciously," was held not
properly supplied by amendment to an indictment for arson.
Where the venue is not properly shown the indictment is fatally de-
fective according to State v. AIrmstrong, 4 Minn. 335 (1 86o), wherein
the court commented that to permit amendment of an indictment not
disclosing the jurisdiction of the court would be to hold the accused other-
wise than on the indictment of a grand jury, and would be prejudicial
13 A dissenting opinion cited People v. Spence, 250 Mich. 573, 231 N.W. 126 (1930)
construing the Michigan statute (Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 17290). However, the Michigan
case concerned amendment of information to charge an offense before a jury was im-
paneled, and this amendment was allowed.
The source of section 13437-29, supra, is Michigan Public Acts 1927, p. 315, sec. 76
(Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 17290). This statute was in turn based upon prior Michigan
ztatutez, among them Sec. 11 of Act 77, 185 5 ), permitting amendment as to form. This
latter statute was held constitutional in People v. Meyer, 204 Mich. 331, 169 N.W. 889
(s 9 x8), but the constitutionality of sec. 17290, supra, has not as yet been fully tested,
although it has been declared constitutional in People v. Sims, z57 Mich. 478, 241 N.W.
247 (r932).
"' But see Stockum v. State, Io6 Ohio St. 249 (1922); Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio
St. x84 (1869); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 5Sr, 20 Sup. Ct. 448, 44 L. Ed. 597 (19oo);
Hurtado v. California, 11O U.S. 5S6, 28 L.Ed. 232, 4 S.Ct. 1ii (1884), and numerous
other authorities, holding that the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution does not
control the criminal procedure of the several states.
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to him. Accord: State v. Chamberlain, 6 Nev. 257 (087); State v.
Kelly, 66 N. H. 577, 29 At. 843 (1891); State v. Blakeney, 33 S.
Car. lII, I S.E. 63 7 (189o). Contra: Breinigv. State, 124 Ohio St.
39, 176 N.E. 674, 33 Ohio L.R. 649, 9 Ohio L. Abs. 333 (1930),1
and Welty v. Ward, 164 Ind. 457, 73 N.E. 889, 3 Ann. Cas. 556
(1905).
In the Federal courts the doctrine of "no amendment" prevails by
virtue of strict interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. Thus, the cases
decided by those courts are, by and large, a reiteration of the early com-
mon law doctrine. Ex parte Bain, 121 U. S. I, 30 L. Ed. 849, 7 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 781, 6 Am. Crim. Rep. 122 (1886); U.S. v. Dembowski,
252 Fed. 894 (i918); Dodge v. U.S., 169 C.C.A. 316, 258 Fed.
300 (1919); Stewart v. U. S., 12 Fed. (2d) 524 (1926); U. S. v.
Libby, McNeill & Libby, 7 Alaska 356 (1925), all relying on U. S.
Const., Am. Art. V.
One State, Alabama, stands apart from the rest in its administration
of this problem. The statute there provides for amendment of indict-
ment, etc., "with the consent of the defendant," and this has been con-
strued to mean no amendment without his consent. Gregory v. State,
46 Ala. 151 (1871), extending this rule to even the amendment of the
caption; Johnson v. State, 46 Ala. 212 (1871); Jackson v. State, 21
Ala App. 284, 107 So. 725 (1926); Dix v. State, 8 Ala. App. 338,
62 So. 1007 (913). But where defendant consented, amendment was
permitted as to matters of form in Ross v. State, 55 Ala. 177 (876),
and Reynolds v. State, 92 Ala. 44, 9 So. 398 (1891).
In all instances enabling statutes of the various jurisdictions must
be considered and construed in connection with, and subject to, the
constitutional provisions of the particular state. With respect to those
states authorizing amendment as to matters of form, the weight of
authority, as shown by the citations throughout this discussion, is that
they are constitutional. However, some statutes are, prima facie, broad
enough to include matters of substance, as well as those of form, and it
is with respect to such statutes that the most imporant consideration
must be given. In 1877 the New Jersey court said: "It is plain that
the legislature cannot constitutionally authorize an amendment in sub-
stance which will change an indictment found by a grand jury." State
v. Startup, 39 N.J.L. 423. Accord, under a statute permitting amend-
ment as to form or substance apparent on the face of the indictment,
State v. Twining, 71 N.J.L. 388, 58 Ad. lO98 (1904). So, in Cor.
v. Snow, supra, under a statute broad enough to include both matters of
"5 Under Ohio Gen. Code 13437-29, supra.
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form and substance within its provisions authorizing amendment,"0 the
Massachusetts court held that there could be no amendment as to mat-
ters of substance; that the statute must be construed in the light of the
constitution of that state, and, a fortiori must be restricted to provide for
amendment of matters of form, and not substance. These expressions are
in full accord with the majority view. In People v. Foster, 243 Pac.
667, 198 Cal. 112 (1926), the court limited the operation of the Cali-
fornia code provision to extend only to matters of form, and held it, as
so limited, constitutional.'" See also, People v. Sims, 241 N.W. 247,
257 Mich. 478 (1932), holding the Michigan statute,"8 from which
our Ohio enabling act was derived, constitutional, insofar as it authorizes
amendment of matters of form. The principal Ohio statute' 9 is, how-
ever, broader in its expression than that of any other jurisdiction. It
expressly authorizes amendment as to matters of substance, but, to
counterbalance this power, requires that the defendant be not misled or
prejudiced, and that the identity or nature of the crime be not changed.
The leading Ohio case passing upon this section is Breinig v. State, supra,
which held that under Section 13437-29 the court is permitted to amend
an indictment by inserting the venue of the offense where it is not stated,
providing the defendant is not prejudiced; and further held that the
provision in question is constitutional in permitting amendments both as-
to form and substance, with the qualifications afore-mentioned. But, in
Harris v. State, 125 Ohio St. 257, i8i N.E. 104, 36 Ohio L.R. 328
(1932), the court ruled that omission of an essential element of a crime
from an indictment cannot be cured by amendment, as such procedure
would violate the constitutional rights of the accused inasmuch as he
would be tried upon an indictment different from that found by the
grand jury. Referring to Breinig v. State, supra, Jones, J. (who wrote
both opinions) remarked: "It is clear that venue has no connection with
the substance, identity or character of the offense." 125 Ohio St. 257,
264. See State v. Vhitmore et al., 126 Ohio St. 381, i85 N.E.
547, 37 Ohio L.R. 56o, 128 Ohio St. 497, 40 Ohio L.R. 65o (i933),
citing and approving Breinig v. State, supra. Then, in Bryant v. State,
48 Ohio App. 208, i6 Ohio L. Abs. 335, I Ohio Op. 179 (1933), the
court permitted an amendment changing an allegation in the indictment
from murder "while in perpetration of a robbery," to "while attempting
to commit robbery," holding that this did not change the name or
identity of the crime within Section 13437-29. So too, in Roberts v.
"A Mass. Acts and Resolves 5926, c. 277, sec. 3sa.
17 Deering Cal. Penal Code, sec. 835, and sec. sooS (193i).
Ms ich. Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 17290. See footnote 13, supra.
'D Section 13437-Z9. See notes i and 6, supra.
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State, 45 Ohio App. 65, 186 N.E. 748, 38 Ohio L.R. 299, 13 Ohio
L. Abs. 566 (1932), where the indictment charged the accused as a
"deputy clerk," it was held permissible to amend the charge to read
"employee," the offense being acceptance of a bribe by a public official.
The court held that this was not a change of the identity of the crime,
nor a surprise or prejudice to the defendant. The last reported case in
point from Ohio is State v. Foster, 56 Ohio App. 267, io N.E. (2d)
786, 23 Ohio L. Abs. 278, 9 Ohio Op. 363 (936), wherein the court
held that it was not error to amend an indictment by inserting the word
"motor" before the word "truck" where the charge was driving a moto r
vehicle while intoxicated, in order to put the indictment in the words of
the statute, the court resting four-square on Section 13437-29.
Thus it would seem that, today, the Ohio courts at least, would
permit amendment of indictments as to matters either of form or sub-
stance, so long as no prejudice accrues to the defendant, nor any change
in the nature or identity of the crime is made. The great weight of
authority is firmly contra regarding matters of substance, and squarely
in accord with reference to matters of form. And, from a summary of
the more recent cases, it would seem that the time of the making of the
amendment is not restricted to the pleading before trial, but may include
"any time," as is expressly stipulated in sec. 13437-29, supra. People V.
Milligan, 247 Pac. 580, 77 Cal. App. 745 (1926); People v. Win-
throp, 88 Cal. App. 591 , 264 Pac. 263 (1928); Breinig v. State, supra.
However, judging by all the cases, clearly the great weight of authority
restricts amendments to the time preceding trial. (Clark, Crim. Proc.
2d ed. 365). Informations are, by the great weight of authority, amend-
able at any time. Ables v. State, 35 Okla. Cr. 26, 247 Pac. 423
(1926); Robards v. State, 37 Okla. Cr. 371, 259 Pac. i66 (1927);
State v. Stebbins, 29 Conn. 463, 79 Am. S. Rep. 223 (I86i).
Insofar as affidavits are concerned, it may be flatly stated that their
amendability is nil, the courts unanimously holding that, although an
affidavit is amendable in civil proceedings,2" no such privilege obtains to
these documents in criminal cases where the cause is predicated thereon.
City of Toledo v. Harris, supra. In Diebler v. State, 43 Ohio App. 350,
183 N.E. 84, 37 Ohio L.R. 232 (1932), the court, being confronted
with Sections 13433-2 and 13433-3 of the Ohio Gen. Code,2 ruled
that these stipulations must be strictly construed, and consequently held
that the court or magistrate has no power to amend affidavits. "No court
20 Ohio Gen. Code Ix 3635 1 Ohio Jur. 6oo, sec. S. See Moorehead v. Briggs, Adm'r.,
igz IlL. App. 361 (sgio), holding that affidavits cannot be amended by erasures and
interlineations.2' Note 6, supra. See also, Dennis v. State, z8 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 392 (193).
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or public officer has authority to force an individual to say something
different from what that individual actually did say or express a willing-
ness to say." Reiterating this statement, the court in Snyder v. State,
ex rel. McCoy, 53 Ohio App. 370, 4 N.E. (2d) 944, 4 Ohio Op. 537,
2o Ohio L. Abs. 292 (i935), held that an affidavit is the act of an
individual and cannot be amended or changed without a new verification
by the afflant; and added that Sections 13437-7 and 13437-29 exclude,
by implication, affidavits from their scope. The court in In re Bonanno,
28 N.P. (N.S.) 527, 9 Ohio L. Abs. 521 (93), upheld a reduction
of a charge based on an affidavit, by virtue of sec. 13433-3, from felony
to misdemeanor in accordance with the facts and the evidence, but did
not mention the amendability of the affidavit itself."2
In all instances it is important to distinguish statutes of amendment
from statutes of jeofails. The former authorize the curing of defects by
amendments actually made in the record, whereas the latter direct the
court not to recognize the defect(s) after a time or step mentioned.
(Clark, Crim. Proc. 2d ed. 373)-
In summarization, it is only necessary to set forth the salient and
opposing arguments on the question of amendment of indictments and
affidavits. Some few of the courts, including Ohio, urge a freer amend-
ability of these instruments of procedure, citing the practical expediency
of such a course. Opposed to this legislation is the constitutional and
individual rights argument, which, in effect proclaims that to permit
amendment of indictments and affidavits as to substance is to prejudice
the accused and deprive him of his constitutional right to a formal
accusation by a grand jury on oath, and the corollary assurance against
deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law. These
objections do not, of course, obtain to prosecution by information. On
the other hand, where prosecution is by affidavit, still another objection
is raised, v;z., that against putting words into an affiant's mouth which
he did not say and might be unwilling to say. The writer, with defer-
ence to opposing views, submits that the objections to freer amendability
of criminal pleadings are, in his estimation, superior to the arguments
raised in defense of such legislation, and that amendment of indictment
and affidavit as to matters of substance ought not be permitted, as being
violative of the constitutional rights of the accused.
ROBERT H. JONES
"'See also, Ingbam v. State, 35 Ohio App. 311, 172 N.E. 4oi (2929).
